1,169 research outputs found
A project based approach to learning for first year engineering students
Support for transition from Leaving Certificate and entry to college for 1st year engineering students
can be difficult to achieve. This new course offers an innovative project based approach to learning for
1st years with an introduction to design to build confidence in student ability and give motivation in
research and discovery skills. The project takes place in small groups and relies heavily on
presentation, group and individual skills. The Mechanical and Manufacturing and the Electronic
Engineering Schools at Dublin City University offered this new module for all first year Engineering
Students in 2006. The course entitled, âProject and Laboratory Skillsâ was an immediate success with
increased participation and retention rates and a high level of academic success in assessment. This
paper highlights the overall module concepts, teaching and learning outcomes and the resources
required for such a module
LOGIC TEACHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY
We are much better equipped to let the facts reveal themselves to us instead of blinding ourselves to them or stubbornly trying to force them into preconceived molds. We no longer embarrass ourselves in front of our students, for example, by insisting that âSome Xs are Yâ means the same as âSome X is Yâ, and lamely adding âfor purposes of logicâ whenever there is pushback. Logic teaching in this century can exploit the new spirit of objectivity, humility, clarity, observationalism, contextualism, and pluralism. Besides the new spirit there have been quiet developments in logic and its history and philosophy that could radically improve logic teaching. This lecture expands points which apply equally well in first, second, and third courses, i.e. in âcritical thinkingâ, âdeductive logicâ, and âsymbolic logicâ
Remembering my Life with Peter Hare
Excerpts and paraphrases of this memoir appeared in 2008 and 2009. I posted it in full here in happy memory of Peter Hare and my joyful years with him. -/- 2008. Remembering Peter Hare 1935â2008. Philosophy Now. Co-authors: T. Madigan and A. Razin. Issue 66 March/April 2008. Pages 50â2. PDF -/- 2009. Remembering My Life with Peter Hare. Remembering Peter Hare 1935â2008. Ed. J. Campbell. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. pp. 9â16.
http://american-philosophy.org/documents/RememberingPeterHare_final.pdf -/- Peter H. Hare, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Buffalo (SUNY at Buffalo), died peacefully in his sleep on Thursday, January 3, 2008.
I would like to share my memories of my life with him. Others have eulogized him, enumerated his virtues and accomplishments, and written his obituaries. I am revisiting my personal relationship with him. These memories are as much about me as about him
Iffication, Preiffication, Qualiffication, Reiffication, and Deiffication.
Iffication, Preiffication, Qualiffication, Reiffication, and Deiffication.
Roughly, iffication is the speech-act in whichâby appending a suitable if-clauseâthe speaker qualifies a previous statement. The clause following if is called the qualiffication. In many cases, the intention is to retract part of the previous statementâcalled the preiffication. I can retract part of âI will buy threeâ by appending âif I have moneyâ. This initial study focuses on logical relations among propositional contents of speech-actsânot their full conversational implicatures, which will be treated elsewhere. The modified statementâcalled the ifficationâis never stronger than the preiffication. A degenerate iffication is one logically equivalent to its preiffication. There are limiting cases of degenerate iffications. In one, the qualiffication is tautological, as âI will buy three if three is threeâ. In another, the negation of the qualiffication implies the preiffication, as âI will buy three if I will not buy threeâ. Reiffication is iffication of an iffication. âI will buy three if I have moneyâ is reifficated by appending âif there are three leftâ. Deiffication is the speech-act in whichâby appending a suitable and-clauseâthe effect of an iffication is cancelled so that the result implies the preiffication. âI will buy three if I have moneyâ is deifficated by appending âand I have moneyâ. All further examples come from standard (one-sorted, tenseless, non-modal) first-order arithmetic. All theorems are about first-order arithmetic propositions. An easy theorem, hinted above, is that an iffication is degenerate if and only if the negation of the qualiffication implies the preiffication. The iffication of a conjunction using one of the conjuncts as qualiffication need not imply the other conjunct: âTwo is an even square if two is squareâ does not imply âTwo is evenâ. END OF PRINTED ABSTRACT.
Some find that the last statement provides a surprise in logic. https://www.academia.edu/s/a5a4386b75?source=link
Acknowledgements: Robert Barnes, William Frank, Amanda Hicks, David Hitchcock, Leonard Jacuzzo, Edward Keenan, Mary Mulhern, Frango Nabrasa, and Roberto Torretti
A Inseparabilidade entre LĂłgica e a Ătica.
A Inseparabilidade entre LĂłgica e a Ătica. PhilĂłsophos. 18 (2013) 245â259.
Portuguese translation by DĂ©cio Krause and Pedro Merlussi: The Inseparability of Logic and Ethics, Free Inquiry, Spring 1989, 37â40.
This essay takes logic and ethics in broad senses: logic as the science of evidence; ethics as the science of justice. One of its main conclusions is that neither science can be fruitfully pursued without the virtues fostered by the other: logic is pointless without fairness and compassion; ethics is pointless without rigor and objectivity. The logicianâs advice to be dispassionate is in resonance and harmony with the ethicistâs advice to be compassionate
CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
This elementary 4-page paper is a preliminary survey of some of the most important uses of âconditionâ and âconsequenceâ in American Philosophy. A more comprehensive treatment is being written. Your suggestions, questions, and objections are welcome. A statement of a conditional need not be a conditional statement and conditional statement need not be a statement of a conditional
meanings of hypothesis
The primary sense of the word âhypothesisâ in modern colloquial English includes âproposition not yet settledâ or âopen questionâ. Its opposite is âfactâ in the sense of âproposition widely known to be trueâ. People are amazed that Plato [1, p. 1684] and Aristotle [Post. An. I.2 72a14â24, quoted below] used the Greek form of the word for indemonstrable first principles [sc. axioms] in general or for certain kinds of axioms. These two facts create the paradoxical situation that in many cases it is impossible to translate the Greek form of the word using the English form: the primary sense of the word âhypothesisâ in modern colloquial English is diametrically opposed to one sense used by Plato and by his most accomplished student
Given current colloquial English usage it is impossible to get the word hypothesis to carry the connotation of âsettled truthâ much less âaxiomatic truthâ. The âhypo-â [under] in the Plato-Aristotle use of âhypothesisâ might carry the sense of âbasisâ or âfoundationalâ as opposed to âless than usual or normalâ.
This paradox parallels the one pointed out by Robin Smith: it is impossible for the English word âsyllogismâ to carry the meaning of its Greek form Aristotle intended. There are other cases as well: it is impossible for the English biological term âgenusâ to carry the meaning of its Greek form the Greek genos refers to family as in our âgenealogyâ, not to âhigher speciesâ as in our âgenericâ
The Contemporary Relevance of Ancient Logical Theory
This interesting and imaginative monograph is based on the authorâs PhD dissertation supervised by Saul Kripke. It is dedicated to Timothy Smiley, whose interpretation of PRIOR ANALYTICS informs its approach. As suggested by its title, this short work demonstrates conclusively that Aristotleâs syllogistic is a suitable vehicle for fruitful discussion of contemporary issues in logical theory. Aristotleâs syllogistic is represented by Corcoranâs 1972 reconstruction.
The review studies Learâs treatment of Aristotleâs logic, his appreciation of the Corcoran-Smiley paradigm, and his understanding of modern logical theory. In the process Corcoran and Scanlan present new, previously unpublished results. Corcoran regards this review as an important contribution to contemporary study of PRIOR ANALYTICS: both the book and the review deserve to be better known
second-order logic
âSecond-order Logicâ in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds. Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61â76.
Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols.
It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes.
To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic.
Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as radical: an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition, a tradition that is defended by classical logicians. But it is also viewed as reactionary: as being analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of âAristotelianâ traditional logic.
But even if âgenuineâ logic comes to be regarded as excluding second-order reasoning, which seems less likely today than fifty years ago, its effectiveness as a heuristic instrument will remain and its importance for understanding the history of logic and mathematics will not be diminished.
Second-order logic may someday be gone, but it will never be forgotten.
Technical formalisms have been avoided entirely in an effort to reach a wide audience, but every effort has been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor.
People who do not know second-order logic cannot understand the modern debate over its legitimacy and they are cut-off from the heuristic advantages of second-order logic. And, what may be worse, they are cut-off from an understanding of the history of logic and thus are constrained to have distorted views of the nature of the subject. As Aristotle first said, we do not understand a discipline until we have seen its development. It is a truism that a person's conceptions of what a discipline is and of what it can become are predicated on their conception of what it has been
Logically Equivalent False Universal Propositions with Different Counterexample Sets.
This paper corrects a mistake I saw students make but I have yet to see in print. The mistake is thinking that logically equivalent propositions have the same counterexamplesâalways. Of course, it is often the case that logically equivalent propositions have the same counterexamples: âevery number that is prime is oddâ has the same counterexamples as âevery number that is not odd is not primeâ. The set of numbers satisfying âprime but not oddâ is the same as the set of numbers satisfying ânot odd but not not-primeâ.
The mistake is thinking that every two logically-equivalent false universal propositions have the same counterexamples. Only false universal propositions have counterexamples.
A counterexample for âevery two logically-equivalent false universal propositions have the same counterexamplesâ is two logically-equivalent false universal propositions not having the same counterexamples.
The following counterexample arose naturally in my sophomore deductive logic course in a discussion of inner and outer converses. âEvery even number precedes every odd numberâ is counterexemplified only by even numbers, whereas its equivalent âEvery odd number is preceded by every even numberâ is counterexemplified only by odd numbers.
Please let me know if you see this mistake in print. Also let me know if you have seen these points discussed before. I learned them in my own course: talk about learning by teaching
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